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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	D/O S	30 MAR 1973	HJO
2	DD IPTOS	3/30/73	HJO
3	ADD/PTOS	3/30/73	HJO
4	AC/Phy SD		HJO
5	DC/Phy SD (CS)		
6			

<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

APR 4 8 45 AM '72

Info

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

Officer

30 MAR 1973

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

075-B

SUBJECT: (Optional)			
FROM: Director of Security 4E-60, Hqs.		EXTENSION	NO. STAT
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		OFFICER'S INITIALS	DATE
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. ADD/M&S 7D-26, Hqs.	29 MAR 1973	Reddy/mw	1 to 2 -
2. Director of Security Rm 4E60, Hqs			Oz:
3.			Please follow this matter closely and keep DD/M&S advised of developments. We certainly do not want to be caught short on this matter.
4.			
5.			STAT
6.			Robert S. Wattles
7.			Att
8.			Memo dtd 27 Mar 73 for ADD/M&S fr D/S, subj: Rationalization of "Green Sheet" Accountability for TS Materials (DD/M&S 73-1181)
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

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27 MAR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for
Management and Services

SUBJECT : Rationalization of "Green Sheet"
Accountability for TS Materials

REFERENCE : Memorandum from Director,
Central Reference Service, dated
14 Mar 73, same subject (DDI-703-73;
DDS 73-1051)

1. This memorandum is for your information only.
2. In reference the Director, CRS, cites a proposal under consideration by the Director of Central Intelligence to remove some material from compartmented TK control; implementation of this proposal could result in an increase in the volume of documents in the Agency's Top Secret control system. He suggests that this increase might be of such a magnitude that existing Top Secret control procedures would be impractical to maintain.
3. The Office of Security is aware that the Deputy Director for Intelligence has submitted to the Director in response to the latter's request a proposal to change the current security compartmentation of satellite photography and that under this proposal much of this material would be removed from the compartmented controls and classified in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 11652.
4. Despite its frantic tone I believe that reference exaggerates the portents of the proposal now before the Director. The

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following observations support my belief:

a. Approval of the proposal is dependent not only upon the persuasion of the Director but also the judgment of the President. The current system of controls was established in response to a Presidential Directive; any changes in the system will require USIB consultation as well as Presidential approval. I believe Presidential approval at this time is presumptuous.

b. Under the proposal any TK material removed from compartmented control would be classified and handled under the provisions of Executive Order 11652. Reference cites the "worst case" possibility, whereby all such decontrolled material might be classified Top Secret. The criteria of Executive Order 11652 for determining classification level suggest that the majority of the substantive intelligence information removed from TK control would properly fall in the Secret category. While some material would necessarily be classified Top Secret, I believe this would represent only a small percentage of the decontrolled material. While I support the case to remove from compartmented control the material identified in the proposal, concurrently and with emphasis I shall insist that such decontrolled material be properly classified in accordance with the Executive Order and not merely be transferred in toto from a compartmented control system to the equally restrictive Top Secret Control environment.

5. Reference speaks of the rationalization of the Agency system for control and accountability of Top Secret collateral materials but fails to identify specifics of this system other than its reference to the "Green Sheet". Executive Order 11652 defines and defends the requirement for Top Secret control. It would be

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counterproductive to water down such controls to satisfy the individual case.

6. The Office of Security has recently assumed management of the Agency's Top Secret control system. It is in the process of reviewing the deficiencies in this system for the purpose of implementing remedial action while concurrently examining the excesses in Top Secret control mechanisms with a view toward simplification. It is planned to modify existing control procedures to make the system both more effective and less cumbersome. Specifically, we intend to maintain the degree of control and the related procedures actually required by Executive Order 11652 and its implementing National Security Council Directive without adding to them.

7. One of the specific simplifications under study is the elimination of cover sheets. Another, perhaps more distant goal, is the development of an automated control system for Top Secret collateral material throughout the Agency. Movement toward these objectives is dependent upon the cooperation of the several Directorates insofar as this is an Agency-wide problem. In addition, there are parallel activities taking place which will affect our progress. For example, a task force chaired by [] is addressing the need for a review of compartmented controls.

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8. In assuming responsibility for Agency Top Secret control management this Office had already begun review of current procedures as defined in Headquarters Regulation []. While this review continues, reference serves to stimulate our attention in this area. We accept the offer of assistance expressed by the Director, CRS, in reference and are already in contact with his representative to better quantify the parameters of the problem.

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9. I am conveying the thoughts expressed in this memorandum to the Director, CRS, and will keep you advised of developments in this area. For your information I am coordinating our activities in this regard with the Special Assistant for Information Control.



Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

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DDI-703-73

DD/S 73-1051

14 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

THROUGH: Assistant Deputy Director for
Intelligence
Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT: Rationalization of "Green Sheet"
Accountability for TS Materials

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to state that the DDI wishes rationalization of the Agency system for control and accountability of Top Secret collateral materials--a system typified by the "green sheet."

2. We expect approval by the DCI of the proposal to remove from the TKH compartment much of the substantive intelligence information contained therein, and classification of this material according to content as required by E.O. 11652. The possibility that an undetermined portion of this material will thereafter be classified as TS collateral brings in sharp focus the need to revise a system which we consider too cumbersome to cope with a heavy load of additional documents.

3. To illustrate briefly the impact the TKH decompartmentation proposal could theoretically have on the TS system, let me cite some statistics. CIA's Central Top Secret Control disseminated in 1972 a total of 688 TS (including NATO, SEATO, CENTO SECRET) items to an average of six dissemines per item. The total green-sheeted items therefore amounted to approximately 4,128 per year. Your people estimate this

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SUBJECT: Rationalization of "Green Sheet"
Accountability for TS Materials

at only 15% of the actual Agency flow (DDO being the largest source outside CRS). The total Agency figure would probably be in the area of 27,500 green-sheet copies. The volume of TKH cables, OAKs, and hard copy reports currently disseminated by CRS throughout the Agency, however, is estimated at approximately 430,000 copies! The volume of additional green sheets added to the Agency Top Secret Control System could therefore vary from 1 to 430,000, depending on the decision of the classifiers. The existing system is already cumbersome to a degree that affects effective use of material contained by the "green sheets." Further growth will from necessity require modification of the system. The modification should be deliberate and ordered. If not, it will be casually achieved through circumvention with the inevitable problems that would then result.

4. The Office of Security recently assumed responsibility for management and policy in Top Secret Control matters. CRS's Dissemination Branch continues to staff and control the dissemination function for TS. Office of Security's newly appointed Top Secret Control Officer has been surveying existing accountability controls and procedures with the aim of making recommendations for improving the system. Additionally, Compartmented Information Branch has for several months been reviewing control procedures for both codeword and collateral materials. These efforts indicate that OS itself has under way actions intended to improve the handling of classified materials.

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SUBJECT: Rationalization of "Green Sheet"
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5. The imminence of considerably heavier document loads into the TS control system, however, clearly indicates the need for higher priority to such actions. [redacted] of your staff has already been contacted by [redacted], Chief of our Acquisitions and Dissemination Division, about the concern of the DDI with green sheets and the urgency of action because of the TKH proposal. [redacted] has indicated that he and his staff are already at work on the problem, particularly with respect to the new strictures on classification and controls laid down by E.O. 11652. He has also indicated the utility of a more formal request for action from the DDI. This memorandum can be so regarded.

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6. My staff is available for any assistance this project may require. The experience of our Dissemination Branch personnel may be of value in designing a more rational and practical TS control system. [redacted] is available for such support as OS may desire.

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[redacted]
H. C. EISENBERG
Director, Central Reference Service

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